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Traditional leadership often coexists with modern political institutions, yet we know little about 
how traditional and state authority cues—or those from male or female sources—affect public 
opinion. Using an original survey experiment of 1,381 Malawians embedded in the 2016 Local 
Governance Performance Index (LGPI), we randomly assign respondents into one of four 
treatment groups or a control group to hear messages about a child marriage reform from a 
female or male traditional authority (TA) or parliamentarian. In the sample as a whole, the 
female TA is as effective as the control (i.e., no endorsement), while other messengers elicit 
lower support (i.e., backfire effects). Endorsements produce heterogeneous effects across 
respondent sex and patrilineal/matrilineal customs, suggesting the need for tailored programs. 
Our analysis adds an intersectional approach to the governance literature, suggesting a 
theoretical framework that enables us to explain the impact of state and traditional endorsements 
across policy domains. 
 










 How and why do authority type and gender shape citizen’s acceptance of women’s 
rights reforms? International agents increasingly see traditional leaders as partners in 
development (Baldwin, 2016), enlisting them as advocates for legal reforms which curb gender 
discriminating practices, such as setting a minimum age of marriage (Muriaas et al., 2018). 
Earlier research saw traditional authorities (TAs) as antithetical to women’s rights (Charrad, 
2001; Hudson et al, 2015). Increasingly, however, development practitioners suggest that it is 
necessary not only to engage activists, but also to compel accountability from dominant social 
agents (Toyo, 2006). These strategies are based on studies demonstrating that traditional leaders 
are highly respected and play a major role in African contemporary politics (Logan, 2009),  
 Yet, despite the growing recognition about the importance of TAs as partners for 
development, we know little about whether traditional leaders, considered key custodians of 
culture (Charrad, 2001; Englebert, 2000), are effective promoters of women’s rights issues 
among common citizens. Moreover, the answer may depend on the leader’s gender in some 
important ways. While men have greater authority, due to their predominance in positions of 
power (Eagly and Karau, 2002), this assumption may not hold for gender rights—a policy 
domain associated with female competencies. For instance, there is considerable evidence, drawn 
from the gender and politics literature and role congruity theory, that citizens expect female 
leaders to prioritize and excel in matters relating to health, education, and women’s rights 
(Lawless, 2004; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Rosenwasser and Seale, 1988). Their role in this 
regard may simply be seen as more acceptable than that of engaging in other more traditionally 




male-oriented policy domains (Eagly and Karau, 2002).1 Yet, authority gender, as well as 
authority institution—whether state or traditional authorities—have seldom been considered in 
connection with policy advocacy.  
 This article draws on insights from several literatures and develops expectations about 
the role of traditional and state authorities in shaping citizens’ attitudes about child marriage 
reform—a gendered human right.2 As noted, the emerging literature on governance and 
traditional leadership suggests that traditional leaders may have a greater capacity to organize 
and broker responses to rural problems than elected politicians (Cammack et al., 2009; Díaz-
Cayeros et al., 2014; Baldwin, 2016), although we still need more research to unpack how and 
why this is the case. We contribute to and extend these ongoing discussions by testing whether 
traditional leaders have a more positive effect on policy advocacy for human rights reform than 
elected officials. Few studies examine TAs’ effectiveness as public opinion influencers and to 
our knowledge, ours is the first to examine the impact of female TAs specifically. For instance, a 
study by Bush and Jamal (2015) shows that although most Jordanians report favorable attitudes 
about imams, endorsements by religious authorities do not improve support for women’s 
representation. Bush and Jamal’s study does not, however, differentiate authorities by gender. 
                                                          
1 Briefly, gender role congruity theory argues that prejudice against female leaders arises from 
the incongruity between traits associated with the female gender roles (e.g., that women are 
nurturing) and leadership roles (e.g., decisiveness), which are based on leaders of the past, who 
are often men (Eagly and Karau, 2002). 
2 Child marriage is regarded as a women’s rights issue because the practice has grave 
implications for women’s health, education, and economy (see Toyo, 2006).  




Moreover, Benstead et al. (2015) examine the electability of female and religious candidates, but 
do not look at their impact as public opinion influencers, even though this is an important and 
overlooked form of symbolic representation (Bauer, 2016).3 Clayton (2014) is the only scholar to 
argue that gender may matter across authority type. Her work in Lesotho suggests that traditional 
leaders have less power when they are elected in local electoral divisions that are reserved for 
women. 
So too, the gender and politics literature places substantial emphasis on how female 
leaders shape agendas and influence political outcomes (Bauer, 2012; Franceschet et al., 2012; 
Tamale, 1999; Wang, 2013). Still, this research focuses almost entirely on state actors, such as 
parliamentarians (MPs) and cabinet ministers, and does not examine the role of leaders’ gender 
in their governance effectiveness. Analyses of how female MPs shape attitudes and a focus on 
gendered aspects of traditional leadership is missing. This gap exists in part because scholars 
and practitioners assume that traditional leaders are men, and they expect TAs to promote 
patriarchal practices (Bauer, 2016; Htun and Weldon, 2010). Yet, female traditional leaders are 
almost as common as female elected representatives in countries such as Malawi and rural 
Zambia, where matrilineal cultural practices exist. In Malawi, 10 percent of traditional leaders 
are women, while 13 percent of local and 17 percent of national elected seats are held by 
females. Some female traditional leaders have also forwarded feminist goals. For instance, 
                                                          
3 Symbolic representation: “altering gendered ideas about the roles of women and men in 
politics, raising awareness of what women can achieve as political actors and legitimizing 
them as political actors, or encouraging women to become involved in politics” (Bauer and 
Burnet, 2013, 104). 




female senior chief Theresa Kachindamoto of Dedza District in Malawi figured prominently in 
the world media in April 2016, when she annulled 850 child marriages and suspended all village 
heads that refused to ban the practice of child marriage.4 Among the Chewa people of Malawi, 
Mozambique, and Zambia, women played a key role in the selection of their paramount Chief, 
the Kalonga, who rules on behalf of his mother, called Nyangu. In countries like Botswana, 
while no woman has served as president, a woman has also been paramount chief (Bauer, 
2016).5 Despite the importance of female traditional leaders in Africa and Asia, their impacts as 
policy advocates are unexplored. 
To address this gap, we employ an original framing experiment embedded in a survey 
conducted in Malawi in 2016, which allows us to examine the impact of authority type (whether 
traditional or elected) and authority gender (male versus female) on citizens’ support for human 
rights reforms linked to women’s rights. Specifically, we randomly assign 1,381 respondents to 
either a control group or to one of four treatment groups to receive a statement from a male MP, 
male TA, female MP, or female TA. This allows us to test competing hypotheses drawn from 
institutional trust and role congruity theories to explain the impact of different messengers on 
                                                          
4 See for instance Huffington Post ‘How This Female Chief Broke Up 850 Child Marriages In 
Malawi’ by Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, 1 April 2016. Retrieved from 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/woman-chief-breaks-up-850-child-marriages-in-
malawi_us_56fd51c2e4b0a06d580510da 
5 Other examples of women traditional leaders are the queen mothers in the Akan chieftaincy in 
Ghana (Mensah et al., 2014, p. 207), and the Ndlovukati, the queen mother in the Kingdom of 
Swaziland, see Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (Article 7).  




citizens’ support for child marriage reforms and to apply both theories in a novel way to 
traditional governance and policy advocacy. 
Our results show that, in the sample as a whole and among female and matrilineal 
population subgroups, the female TA is as effective as the control. But, the female TA was never 
significantly more effective than the female MP. Examining average treatment effects, we find 
that the female MP, male MP, and male TA elicited a backfire effect—a decline in support for 
the law relative to when no endorsement was presented. The male MP was the most effective 
messenger among patrilineal citizens, while causing a backfire effect among matrilineal citizens. 
Overall, our findings underline important dynamics associated with the promotion of 
women’s rights reform in communities where traditional authorities prevail. Our results suggest 
that traditional institutions influence citizens’ attitudes and that the impact of endorsements 
depends on authority gender and respondents’ gender and lineage practices. They also suggest 
some caution when it comes to advocating for sensitive gender reforms. In no case (i.e., in the 
sample as a whole, or among any sub-group) did an endorsement increase support for the reform 
relative to the control.  
Our results thus emphasize the need for an intersectional theory of policy advocacy that 
takes into account both authority type and gender, as well as the population group. For subgroups 
that are familiar with women as leaders, women tend to be trusted advocates for family law 
reform. This indicates that women leaders are not just tokens, but key gatekeepers for local 
reforms at least within a policy area where they have stereotyped competences. Our findings, 
therefore, call for further research that explores how background characteristics of traditional 
authorities may affect what kind of power they have to change attitudes.  




 The article proceeds in five sections. Following this introduction, in section two we 
introduce the concept of dual governance and explain why a traditional leader’s gender is likely 
to impact policy advocacy effectiveness across policy areas. We proceed by placing child 
marriage reform and the role of traditional leaders in Malawi in a comparative perspective, 
focusing on previous work on gender equality in countries with dual governance. In section 
three, we move to develop our hypotheses about the intersectional impact of authority and 
gender, and we draw on insights from both institutional trust and gender role congruity theories. 
Section five presents our results and discussion. It shows that the female traditional leader is, in 
the sample as a whole, as effective as the control (i.e., average treatment effect), but that various 
subgroups are affected differently by the endorsements (i.e., heterogeneous treatment effects). A 
concluding section completes our paper. 
 
DUAL GOVERNANCE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE CASE OF MALAWI 
Dual governance and traditional leadership is a global phenomenon, found in developing 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In systems of dual governance, 
ethnic groups are often legally recognized and customary law and other forms of law coexist 
(Holzinger et al., 2016, p. 469). Across Africa, European colonialization and indirect rule 
established local intermediaries to govern the capital, leaving TAs intact in the hinterlands 
(Mamdani, 1996, p. 18). Urban, direct, civil rule spoke the language of civil society and civil 
rights, while rural tribal authorities enforced tradition. Since independence, governments across 
Africa have adopted different and evolving strategies toward TAs; some formally incorporated 
traditional governance institutions into their political systems, while others denied them 
recognition (Mijiga, 1998; Bank and Southall, 1996). Currently, traditional authorities typically 




play an important role within the area of internal security, land and resource allocation, public 
health, and matters relating to marriage and inheritance (Holzinger et al., 2016).  
TAs have often been seen by scholars and policymakers as antithetical to gender equality, 
particularly in societies with patrilineal tribes in which the male head benefits from maintaining 
control over women’s marriage choices. For instance, Charrad’s (2001, p. 233) study of state 
formation and family law in North Africa shows that strong, patrilineal tribes led states to adopt 
conservative family laws which allowed tribes to preside over kinship and reproduction, 
negatively affecting women’s rights. Similarly, Htun and Weldon (2010; forthcoming) identify 
historical state accommodation of cultural, traditional, and religious groups as a cause of 
resistance against gender equality reforms. These studies show that many religious, traditional, 
and tribal authorities perceive their continued power as dependent on maintaining control over 
kinship and reproduction. From here, Hudson et al. argue that the particular kinds of female 
subordination—child marriage, cousin marriage, prevalence of polygyny, or sanction for honor-
based violence against women—“serve as indicators of the degree to which clans are salient to 
governance in a given society” (2015, p. 540). This literature, which focuses largely on 
patrilineal tribes, thus points to traditional leaders as a group that would possibly resist gender 
equality reform rather than promote it.  
Villalón’s (2010) study of democratization in the Sahel explains why family law reform 
has been difficult to achieve in the last few decades, despite governments’ intention to alter 
discriminatory practices. According to Villalón, elected leaders might not be the strongest 
champions of change in contexts where they seek to maintain support from religious and 
traditional leaders. This argument is supported by Kang (2015) who, based on studies from 
Niger, argues that while women activists are critical drivers of change, state authorities are less 




likely to adopt women’s rights policies when conservative religious activists mobilize against 
them.  
In recent years, however, traditional leaders have been included in strategies to challenge 
discriminatory cultural practices that are considered detrimental to women and children in 
Malawi and elsewhere. In a comparative study of resistance to child marriage reform in Sudan 
and Zambia, which have patrilineal as well as matrilineal ethnic groups, Muriaas et al. (2018) 
found that including traditional leaders in comprehensive campaigns prevented counter-
mobilization.6 Through inclusion, traditional leaders gained a sense of ownership over the policy 
and were trained to increase their understanding of how child marriage contributed to school 
dropout. Importantly, the strategy did not threaten traditional leaders’ powers—as law reform 
only challenged current practices—or their position as administrators of the law.  
Inclusion of TAs in programs to promote development and women’s rights is linked to 
their proximity to the issues and respondents, and the high trust people have in them. Traditional 
institutions in Malawi play a key role in local communities, and are present across the country.7 
For most Malawians, traditional leaders combine time-honored as well as cultural functions with 
serving as government agents to mobilize subjects for development activities in their areas and 
advancing the government’s agenda. Figure 1 shows that the majority of Malawian citizens 
                                                          
6 In these societies, as well as in Malawi, there are two lineage systems, depending on whether 
citizens trace descent through women (matrilineal) or through men (patrilineal; Kaarhus, 2010).  
7 In Malawi, the role of traditional leaders was legislated as far back as 1912, when the colonial 
administration passed the District Administration (Native) Ordinance, which created a new 
hierarchy of “traditional” authority involving principal and village headmen. 




consider traditional leaders to be relevant in the democratic political space. Equally, around two-
thirds of the country’s citizens approve of traditional leaders taking part in district council 
meetings alongside elected councilors. Citizens’ high confidence in TAs cannot be directly 
linked to accountability, at least in the form of electoral accountability; TAs are not elected and 




Figure 1. Perceived relevance of traditional leaders and acceptance of their participation in district council 
meetings. Source: Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Malawi, and Centre 
for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, 2016. Question wording: “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the current system of having TAs sit as members of the District Council?” “In your 
opinion, how relevant are traditional leaders in modern day Malawi. Would you say they are not relevant 
at all, not relevant, relevant or very relevant?” 
 
Efforts to include traditional leaders as partners are based on studies showing a high 
degree of popular trust in traditional leadership. Survey results from the Afrobarometer reinforce 
the high public regard that TAs in Malawi enjoy as compared to elected officials. Malawians are 
more likely to approve of the performance of TAs than MPs. Figure 2 illustrates that TAs are 
more trusted than the MPs.  





Figure 2. Trust and performance approval for traditional and elected leaders in Malawi 
(Afrobarometer, 2014). Source: Afrobarometer R6 2014.Question wording: “How much do you 
trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” “Parliament,” 
“Traditional leaders.” "Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have 
performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say?” “Your MP" and "Your traditional leader.” 
 
In addition to being a country where traditional leaders are held in high regard, trusted, 
and seen as more accessible, Malawi is a useful case because it has undergone several attempts 
to implement reforms that address long-standing cultural traditions considered discriminatory 
and obstructive to effective development. A recent legal reform in this respect is the Marriage, 
Divorce, and Family Relations Act (The Marriage Act) of 2015, which banned child marriage. 
Child marriage is commonly defined as a formal marriage or informal union entered into before 
the age of 18. The importance of this reform is underscored by the fact that Malawi has one of 
the highest rates of child marriage in the world: 50% of girls marry before age 18 (UNFPA, 
2012). The country is ranked 9th internationally in terms of child marriage prevalence (UNICEF, 
2015), which is common across all three regions of the country, but highest in the central region 
(57%).  




Although other studies that seek to examine public support for law reforms on issues 
ranging from female genital mutilation, criminalizing spousal abuse, and ending child marriage 
have established some levels of social desirability bias among survey respondents (see e.g. 
Cloward, 2014), public support for the law banning child marriage remains important in a 
number of ways. Public support makes the enforcement of the law less costly on the state, as 
members of the public and local leaders can be relied upon to police the application of the law. 
Additionally, reforms that seek to induce behavioral change, as is the case of the Marriage Act, 
are more likely to succeed if they are accepted by the wider public (Bilz and Nadler, 2014, p. 
246). This is particularly the case as customary norms and practices are identified as factors 
contributing to upholding the practice in Malawi (WLSA and NGOGCN, 2009; Panos, 2015).8  
To curb the practice of child marriage, international development agents and the Malawi 
government emphasized the importance of including traditional leaders in the campaign 
(Kachali, 2013; Chimjeka, 2016). This is unsurprising, since most child marriages are conducted 
under customary law and presided over by village headmen, who are widely considered in 
Malawian society to be custodians of culture (Cammack et al., 2009). Traditional leaders across 
the country have been urged by the government to develop action plans against child marriage 
and have attended workshops where they have been acquainted with different aspects of the law. 
While senior chief Theresa Kachindamoto is the most well-known activist of the campaign, 
                                                          
8 In Malawi the key argument used to gather support for the child marriage reform was that early 
marriage causes girls to drop out of school. Another important argument was that a consequence 
of early pregnancies is worsening of women’s health due to for instance the preponderance of 
fistulas, and how this again affects women’s participation in the economy negatively.  




several male traditional leaders have also endorsed it (Kachali, 2013). It is, however, likely that 
we will find clear differences between Malawians with different cultural backgrounds, as well as 
variation in the traditional norms of the two lineages systems, matrilineal and patrilineal, which 
have different practices with regard to women’s role in political leadership (Posner, 2004, p. 
533).  
 
WHO MAKES A GOOD POLICY ADVOCATE?  
MESSENGER INSTITUTION AND GENDER 
 We draw on gender role congruity and institutional trust to anticipate the effects of male 
and female traditional and state authorities on citizens’ views of child marriage. Combining these 
two theoretical models enables us to understand how messenger institution and gender 
intersectionally shape popular views across different population subgroups. 
The Role of Messenger Institution: Trust 
Much of the existing literature on endorsement experiments is drawn from social 
psychology and communications theory and argues that the impact of endorsements depends on 
the extent to which receivers trust the messenger. Following Arceneaux and Kolodny (2009), 
authority cues could compensate for respondents’ lack of awareness about politics. Receivers are 
likely to be swayed by messages from those they trust without analyzing the content of the 
endorsement. This occurs because receivers use simple heuristics, such as whether or not they 
like or trust the source, when engaging with endorsements (Carmines and Kuklinski, 1990; 
Mondak, 1993). Consistently with this theory, Masoud et al. (2016) find that respondents 
exposed to an argument in favor of women’s political empowerment grounded in a religious 




rather than a nonreligious argument are more likely to express support for female political 
leaders, due to their trust in religious institutions.  
Applied to our endorsement experiment comparing messengers from two institutions, an 
institutional trust theory leads us to expect that TAs are more effective messengers than state 
authorities, due to their proximity to the people and the high trust placed in them by the public. It 
follows that male and female TAs will be more effective than male and female MPs (H1).9  
The Role of Messenger Gender: Gendered Authority and Policy Congruence 
Yet, existing literature examining the impact of traditional authorities (Bush and Jamal, 
2015) or institutions (Masoud et al., 2016) does not theorize about how the impact of these 
endorsers depends intersectionally on their gender. To theorize about this, we draw on gender 
role congruity theory and related work from women and politics research. Gender role congruity 
theory was originally developed by Eagly and Karau (2002) to explain women’s 
underrepresentation in business leadership and has subsequently been applied to political 
leadership (King and Matland, 2002; Benstead et al., 2015). Gender role congruity theory 
stipulates that prejudice against female leaders arises from the incongruity between traits 
associated with the female gender roles (e.g., that women are nurturing) and leadership roles 
(e.g., decisiveness), which are based on leaders of the past, who are often men. Stemming from 
                                                          
9 A related literature on the influence of cue sources suggests that political information has a 
greater impact not only when the recipient trusts the messenger, but also when the message goes 
against the sender’s interests and thus seems more credible (Dragojlovic, 2015; Weber, 
Dunaway, and Johnson, 2012). This would suggest that male TAs and MPs will be more 
effective than female TAs and MPs. 




descriptive norms, women as potential occupants of leadership roles are evaluated less favorably 
than men because leadership ability is more stereotypical of men than women. Originating from 
injunctive norms, women’s leadership behavior is evaluated less positively because such 
behavior is perceived as less desirable in women than men (Eagly and Karau, 2002; Eagly and 
Diekman, 2006).  
One possible implication of gender role congruity theory is that, on the whole, women 
will be seen as less authoritative than men and thus be less successful policy endorsers. Yet, to 
the extent that policy domain is considered consistent with behavior that is perceived as 
appropriate for women (e.g., to be concerned with family and gender issues), their leadership 
may be more welcome. Related work in women and politics posits that political leaders will be 
stereotyped as having different policy competencies, related to traditional gender roles, and this 
leads to slightly different expectations in a context in which the policy—child marriage—is 
closely linked to the stereotyped traits and competencies of women. While men are often 
associated with having the traits needed for effective leadership, male and female leaders are 
stereotyped as more competent in policy domains consistent with gender roles (Huddy and 
Therkildsen, 1993; Rosenwasser and Seale, 1988; Lawless, 2004).10 Women are seen as 
competent in policy areas such as children, marriage, family, and education, while men are 
stereotyped as competent in areas such as economy, land, and security. Since the policy domain 
examined in this study relates to perceived female competencies, a competing expectation to that 
of under-evaluation and male authority is that female TAs and MPs will be seen as more 
                                                          
10 Consistently with this theory, women often play a central role in advocating for policies that 
are consistent with liberal gender laws (Bauer 2012; Wang, 2013). 




competent messengers of anti–child marriage (i.e., family-related) messages and will sway 
public opinion more in the intended direction than will male TAs and MPs (H2).  
It may also be the case that institutional trust and gender role congruity theory work in 
tandem, producing intersectional effects. H3 posits that the female TA, since she benefits from 
both high trust (H1) as well as perceived policy competence (H3) will be more effective than 
other endorsers. 
Average treatment effects: 
H1: Overall, TAs will be more effective endorsers of anti–child marriage messages than MPs. 
(Institutional trust hypothesis) 
H2: Overall, female authorities will be more effective endorsers of anti–child marriage messages 
than male authorities. (Gendered policy competence hypothesis) 
H3: Overall, Female TAs will be more effective than other endorsers. (Intersectional hypothesis) 
 
Heterogeneous Effects 
Institutional trust and gender role congruity theories also lead us to expect stronger 
impacts among citizens who are more likely to trust and hold more gender role congruent 
attitudes toward female leaders—namely, female and matrilineal citizens. Gender congruent 
attitudes are those that are more accepting of women as equally good political leaders, due to 
overlapping gender and leader roles (Eagly and Karau, 2002).11 Males have the role of family 
                                                          
11 Role incongruity prejudice is found to be moderated by a number of conditions, including the 
definition of leader roles, the weight given to the leader roles relative to the female gender role, 




head in both family structures, but in matrilineal communities women are surrounded by their 
natal extended families rather than those of their husbands and, therefore, may be able to assert 
more authority (Phiri, 1983). Although a shift towards increasing male control has been noted 
within matrilineal lineage systems, the authority of women in these systems has also proven very 
resilient (Peters, 1997). This implies that female and matrilineal citizens not only hold more role 
congruent views, but also that they will have higher trust in female leaders than will male and 
patrilineal citizens.  
 
Heterogeneous treatment effects: 
H4: Female messengers will increase support more among female than male respondents. 
H5: Female messengers will increase support more among matrilineal than patrilineal citizens 
respondents. 
 
 Thus far, we have considered the relative impact of the four authority types relative to 
one another. Now, we consider how endorsements might impact attitudes relative to the control 
conditions—that is, no endorsement. Literature from political psychology shows that people 
process information in a way that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs and often engage in 
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Molden and Higgins, 2005; Goren et al., 2009). Scholars 
identify two mechanisms: biased assimilation—effects in the direction of the information—and 
backfire effects—impacts in the opposite direction of the statements. Lord et al. (1979) 
demonstrated biased assimilation by showing how scientific studies confirming participants’ 
                                                          
gender (men often show stronger prejudice), and time—e.g., change of attitudes about gender 
roles over time and change in the definition of leader roles (Eagly and Karau, 2002). 




attitudes were interpreted more positively than studies disconfirming their attitudes. Multiple 
laboratory studies later corroborated this bias (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Miller et al., 1993; 
Zuwerink and Devine, 1996), as have field studies (e.g., Ahluwalia, 2000; Munro et al., 2002).  
However, other evidence across different experimental contexts shows that distrust of the 
messenger can also lead to strong, often contradictory, responses. Instead of discounting 
information from a source that is mistrusted, the recipient comes to hold even stronger views 
after encountering the message. Referred to as a backfire effect, this occurs because recipients 
spend more time considering and counter-arguing the information, arriving at more strongly held 
views than they had before (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). Ditto and Lopez (1992) first identified a 
backfire effect when participants in experiments required more information to reach a 
preference-inconsistent conclusion than a preference-consistent conclusion and processed 
information more critically. In another study of citizen misperceptions, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) 
conducted experiments in which they document several instances of backfire effects when 
corrections increase misconceptions. In a study of support for women’s representation in Jordan, 
endorsements by authorities, like religious leaders and American actors, depressed support 
significantly more among regime critical women compared to loyalists (Bush and Jamal, 2015: 
p. 35).  
Accordingly, we anticipate that endorsements could have a negative impact—referred to 
as a backfire effect—relative to the control and this effect could be particularly pronounced 
among those who have less trust in female endorsers—that is, male and patrilineal citizens. 
Backfire effects (relative to the control) are also possible in the sample as a whole, particularly if 
they are sufficiently strong among a large segment of the population. Thus, we expect that 
effects can be positive among those who trust the messenger (relative to the control)—evidence 




for biased assimilation—or negative among those who do not trust the messenger (relative to the 
control)—evidence for backfire effects. 
 
Heterogeneous treatment effects: 
H6: (i) Female messengers will increase support more among female and matrilineal respondents 
relative to the control. (ii) Male messengers will increase support more among male and 
patrilineal respondents relative to the control. (Biased assimilation) 
H7: (i) Female messengers will decrease support more among male and patrilineal respondents 
relative to the control. (ii) Male messengers will decrease support more among female and 
matrilineal respondents relative to the control. (Backfire effect) 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To assess the factors that shape greater support for laws setting the age of marriage at 18 
years of age and the impact of different messengers on support for these laws, we draw on a 
survey experiment embedded within the Local Government Performance Index (LGPI), 
conducted in Malawi in 2016.12 Regular public opinion surveys and other kinds of observational 
data may not be able to detect prejudice against female authorities, either because gender 
prejudices are subconscious or because the answers are tainted by socially desirable responses 
                                                          
12 Lust, E., Harris, A., Kao, K. Landry, P.F., Dulani, B., Zgambo, A., Chiweza, A., Kayuni, H., 
Muriaas, R.L., Rakner, L., Wang, V., Benstead, L., Hartmann, F., and Nickel, S. (2016) “The 
Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) Malawi Dataset.” Program on Governance and 
Local Development, University of Gothenburg. Replication files for this article are available on 
the Comparative Political Studies website.  




(Dolan and Sanbonmatsu, 2011, p. 289). A probability-based survey experiment allows us to 
implicitly test the power of gender cues relative to the power of authority cues on citizens’ 
attitudes, while reducing the effects of social desirability and conformity bias (Benstead, 2014). 
The survey used probabilistic sampling to select 17 TA areas in rural Malawi and an 
additional five local government wards in urban centers. Post-stratification weights were added 
to correct imbalances created by differential response rates across population sub-groups, 
especially an under-representation of men, many of whom were working in neighboring villages, 
towns, or outside the country. The response rate was 94.5% (AAPOR Response Rate 1).  
While 7,500 Malawians participated in the survey, 1,381 randomly selected respondents 
received the experimental prompts. Tests showed that the random assignment of participants into 
the sample was effective and there were no differences in response rates across the frames. 
However, the condition was significantly related to cultural customs (see Appendix 1). 
Therefore, we include several control variables in the ordered logistic regressions. 
Survey Design 
To understand the role of different authorities in increasing opposition to child marriage, 
we asked respondents to rate on a four-point scale the extent to which they agree that the 
minimum age of marriage should be raised to 18. A control group received no frame; 
respondents from this group were simply asked the extent to which they would support the law to 
increase the marriage age to 18. Four treatment groups received the endorsement of a female 








Table 1. Experimental design 
Control: 
The parliament has passed a new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18. What do 




A female MP is supporting the new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18.What do 




A female TA is supporting the new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18.What do 
you think of the law? Do you support it strongly, support it, not support it, or not? (N=272) 
 
Male MP: 
A male MP is supporting the new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18.What do 




A male TA is supporting the new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18.What do 





The conditions are realistic in Malawi. In 2014, 17 percent of candidates winning a seat 
in the national parliament (193 members) were women, which means that Malawi scores beneath 
the regional average of 23.5% (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017). Out of the total of 257 TAs for 
example, only 25 (10 percent) are women. Women chiefs are most common in the densely 
populated southern region where matrilineal lineage systems dominate and particularly in 
Mulanje, Phalombe, Thyolo, and Zomba. This is just slightly lower than the 13 percent and 17 




percent of women representation at local government and parliamentary levels respectively 
(Dulani and Dionne, 2014). 
We carefully considered different ways of formulating the control and the treatment 
conditions in order to make them as similar as possible. Some might consider the control to be a 
stronger statement because it mentions that the new law was passed by parliament, while the 
treatments stated that the new law was supported by different actors. However, we see no reason 
that the new law being passed as opposed to being supported would connote a stronger treatment. 
This is because we expect that respondents would have interpreted this question through the lens 
of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Law of 2015. At the time of the survey in 2016 
there was still continuing public debate over the provisions of the new law and also ongoing 
initiatives by government, legislators, and civil-society organizations to sensitize the public to 
the new law. The term law, as opposed to bill, in the Malawian setting denotes a rule or 
regulation that has been passed by parliament (and assented to by the president), and is legally 
enforceable.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Overall—i.e., in all conditions combined (Figure 3)—there is high support for a law 
banning child marriage: 76% answered that they strongly support, 10% support, and 14% do not 
support. Support for the law is not significantly higher among women, but it is higher in 
matrilineal areas (p<.05) and among those who support gender equality a priori (p<.01). 
 






Figure 3. Support for banning child marriage (all conditions). Data weighted. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4, Malawians have higher trust in their TA than their MP: 53% of 
respondents trust their TA very much, compared to 28% trusting their MP very much. As noted, 
these findings are consistent with other studies presented in figure 1 and 2 (earlier in the article). 
These questions do not distinguish between trust in leaders of different genders, nor do they 
distinguish between different policy competencies, which we believe will differ across 
advocates, based on their gender and possibly their institution.  
 
 






Figure 4. Trust in TAs and MPs in Malawi (%). Data weighted. For question wording: “For each 
of the following, please tell me whether you trust them very much, trust them somewhat, distrust 
them somewhat, or distrust them very much to work for your interests? Your Traditional 
Authority. Your Member of Parliament.” 
 
Measurement of Independent Variables for Testing Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
We also measured several independent variables pretreatment—respondent sex and 
lineage system—which allow us to test our core heterogeneous hypotheses. We measure cultural 
practices as the response to the question: “In your family, is lobola [bride price/dowry] paid 
when people get married?” Yes (=0/Patrilineal). No (=1/Matrilineal). The sample is made up of 
35% male and 65% female citizens. Among the respondents in the experiment, 51% follow a 
matrilineal system, while 49% follow patrilineal customs.13 We expect females and those from 
                                                          
13 In the survey, respondents from the Northern region were disproportionately sampled to 
increase the patrilineal respondents. This means that the 51-49 split is a function of the sample 
clustering and does not imply that there is an almost evenly split between patrilineal and 
matrilineal customs in Malawi.  




matrilineal areas to have more gender role congruent views and higher trust in female leaders 
than males and those from patrilineal areas. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To test the impact of messenger institution and gender, we first estimate average 
treatment effects. Then we examine conditional treatment effects across independent variables 
theoretically related to gender role congruity and institutional trust theory. Because the outcome 
variable is measured on a Likert scale, we use ordered logistic regression rather than means 
comparisons, using a methodology developed by Long and Freese (2014). Inclusion of additional 
demographic control variables for which heterogeneous treatment effects, unless theoretically 
justified, is unnecessary in a randomized treatment assignment and can bias estimation of the 
average treatment effects (Mutz, 2011).14 
Randomization was effective across primary sampling units. However, because the 
treatment was related to lineage system, we include several control variables in the models. 
These include: respondent and interviewer gender (Benstead, 2014), whether the respondent 
follows matrilineal or patrilineal customs, rural residence, age, income quartile, and education 
level, as well as post-stratification weights. (See Appendix 2 Tables A2.1 and A2.2 for full 
regression results). We also conducted robustness checks by running the models with only 
                                                          
14 We estimate the models using Stata 14 updated on May 1, 2017 using current update level 
March 16, 2017. Replications using update levels prior or subsequent to these dates may obtain 
slight differences in p values. 




respondent gender and cultural customs included and found that our results were robust to this 
alternative specification. 
Average Treatment Effects 
Overall, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 2, support for the reform was higher when 
endorsed by one of the female messengers than by either of the male messengers: 75% and 78% 
strongly supported the reform when advocated by a female MP or TA, respectively, while only 
74% and 72% strongly supported the reform when advocated by a male MP or TA, respectively. 
The female TA was the most effective overall, while the male TA was the least effective. 
However, none of the treatments were significantly different from one another. 
Yet, all of the endorsements except for the female TA are significantly less effective than 
the control at the p<.10. This suggests that the only treatment that did not lower support for the 
reform is the female TA. In the sample as a whole, all of the other treatments produced backfire 
effects. In the control condition, 80% are very likely to support the reform, compared to 78% for 
the female TA, a non-significant difference. Yet, 75% strongly support the reform when it is 
endorsed by the female MP, significantly fewer than in the control condition (p<.05). The 
probability is 74% for the male MP (p<.10 relative to the control) and 72% for the male TA 
(p<.10 relative to the control), the least effective messenger. 
 
  










Figure 5 shows predicted probabilities for supporting or opposing the law. Model includes controls for 
respondent gender, interviewer gender, cultural customs, attitudes about gender equality, rural residence, 








Table 2. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (average treatment effects) 
 
Strongly do not support Do not support Support Strongly support 
Comparisons of treatments with control 
   
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1) .049* 0.063† 0.052† 0.037* 
Female TA vs. control (3 vs.1) 0.301 0.506 0.881 0.452 
Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1) .062† .106 0.227 .073† 
Male TA vs. control (5 vs.1) .088† .076† .083† .071† 
Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional) 
   
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2) 0.862 0.365 0.124 0.449 
Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4) 0.769 0.574 0.335 0.566 
Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male) 
   
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2) 0.473 0.872 0.457 0.845 
Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3) 0.370 0.151 .078† 0.181 
Other comparisons 
    
Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) 0.396 0.501 0.684 0.482 
Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) 0.536 0.349 0.333 0.405 
Pooled comparisons (Gender)     
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.128 0.107 0.146 0.100 
Male vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.044* 0.047* 0.041* 0.034* 
Male vs. female (3 vs. 2) 0.324 0.245 0.212 0.249 
Pooled comparisons (Institution)     
TA vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.210 0.130 0.136 0.148 
MP vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.060† 0.076† 0.058† 0.046* 
MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2) 0.883 0.864 0.923 0.888 




We also examined pooled comparisons (Table 2) and found that, in the sample as a 
whole, the female messengers (i.e., both female MP and female TA) do not differ from the 




control, but male messengers (i.e., both male MP and female TA) produce a backfire effect 
relative to the control (p.05). So too, the parliamentarians lead to a backfire effect relative to the 
control (p<.05).  
These pooled comparisons strengthen our initial findings. None of the endorsers, overall, 
are more effective in fostering support for the reform when compared to one another, the female 
TA does not cause a backfire effect, relative to the control. This suggests that TAs may be 
effective endorsers, but that their effect depends on their gender—an intersectional effect that 
suggests support for H3. At the same time, the average treatment effects indicate some troubling 
evidence about potential backfire effects that need to be further investigated through an 
examination of heterogeneous effects. 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
Next, we examine effects across respondent gender and cultural customs, which relate to 
the likelihood of holding gender congruity views and trusting the authorities. We expect female 
messengers to be more effective among female respondents than male (H4) and among 
matrilineal than patrilineal (H5) respondents. This, we argue, is because female and matrilineal 
citizens are likely to have more gender role congruent views and higher trust in female leaders. 
Indeed, we find support for both hypotheses (H4 and H5). Among women, female 
messengers are more effective than male messengers, as predicted by H4 (Figure 6 and Table 3): 
85% strongly support the reform when endorsed by a female TA, while 76% support for reform 
for a female MP. This compares to 68% for a male TA and 75% for a male MP. The difference 
in the support for the female TA and the male TA is statistically significant (p<.05). This 
suggests that for female respondents, TAs are most effective, but only in compared to the male 
TA (p<.05), not the male MP, which is consistent with an intersectional theory (H3) among 




female citizens. Among male respondents, (see Appendix 2 Figure A2.1 and Table A2.3), there 
are no significant differences across the messengers. This may be due in part to the smaller size 
of male sample size. 
 
Figure 6. Predicted probability, women 
 
 
Figure 6 shows predicted probability of supporting the law among women.  
 
  




Table 3. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (women) 
 
Strongly do not support Do not support Support Strongly support 
Comparisons of treatments with control 
   
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.333 0.321 0.353 0.332 
Female TA vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.998 0.935 0.862 0.937 
Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1) 0.134 0.239 0.427 0.215 
Male TA vs. control (5 vs. 1) .094† .105 0.169 .105 
Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional) 
   
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2) 0.325 0.249 0.154 0.234 
Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4) 0.443 0.298 0.224 0.319 
Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male) 
   
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2) 0.546 0.839 0.593 0.816 
Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3) .045* .032* .012* .021* 
Other comparisons 
    
Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) 0.200 0.230 0.300 0.215 
Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) 0.257 0.291 0.283 0.258 
Pooled comparisons (Gender)     
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.128 0.107 0.146 0.100† 
Male vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.044* 0.047* 0.041* 0.034* 
Male vs. female (3 vs. 2) 0.324 0.245 0.212 0.249 
Pooled comparisons (Institution)     
TA vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.162 0.166 0.112 0.131 
MP vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.055† 0.119 0.052† 0.053† 
MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2) 0.996 0.980 0.978 0.998 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.  
 
 
 Analysis of pooled comparisons (Table 3) shows that, among female respondents, there is 
a backfire effect for male messengers relative to the control (p<.05) and for MPs relative to the 
control (p<.10). Among male respondents (not shown in the table), there is a backfire effect for 




MPs relative to the control (p<.10). These findings strengthen our initial result that female TAs 
are as effective as the control, but that an intersectional theory of policy advocacy is needed. 
Female messengers are also more effective for matrilineal than patrilineal citizens, 
consistent with H5 (Figure 7 and Table 4). Among matrilineal citizens, 83% strongly support the 
reform when endorsed by a female TA, while 82% support for reform for a female MP. This 
compares to 80% for a male TA and 73% for a male MP. The difference in the support for the 
female MP and the male MP is statistically significant (p<.05). This suggests that for one 
institution—parliament—female are more effective endorsers than male messengers (p<.05). 
 















Table 4. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (matrilineal) 
 
 
Strongly do not support Do not support Support Strongly support 
Comparisons of treatments with control 
   
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1) .392 0.335 0.330 0.349 
Female TA vs. control (3 vs. 1) 
.363 0.523 0.769 0.506 
Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1) .004** . 004** .002** .001*** 
Male TA vs. control (5 vs. 1) .305 0.288 0.296 0.291 
Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional) 
   
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2) .946 0.649 0.404 0.676 
Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4) .165 0.214 0.396 0.197 
Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male) 
   
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2) .025* .085† 0.183 .037* 
Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3) .703 0.555 0.443 0.573 
Other comparisons 
    
Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) .739 0.799 0.870 0.795 
Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) .048* .012* .013* .016* 
Pooled comparisons (Gender)     
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.515 0.481 0.470 0.482 
Male vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.013* 0.013* 0.009** 0.007** 
Male vs. female (3 vs. 2) 0.037* 0.044* 0.030* 0.029* 
Pooled comparisons (Institution)     
TA vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.308 0.291 0.260 0.276 
MP vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.026* 0.011* 0.008** 0.008** 
MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2) 0.221 0.180 0.199 0.192 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.  
 
The results of the pooled comparison among matrilineal citizens show that male 
messengers cause a backfire effect relative to the control (p<.01) and are less effective than 




female messengers (p<.05). Moreover, MPs cause a backfire effect relative to the control 
(p<.01). This only strengthens our initial finding about the effectiveness of female messengers 
among matrilineal citizens, but the need to engage an intersectional approach that takes 
messenger institution and gender into account (H3). 
Among patrilineal citizens, however, this is not the case, as hypothesized (H5; Figure 8 
and Table 5). Among this group, the most effective endorser is the male MP, for whom 76% 
strongly support the reform. Yet, the female TA still garners the second highest support level—
72%—higher than the female MP (67%) and the male TA (63%). The difference in the support 
for the male MP and TA is statistically significant (p<.05). This suggests that for one 
institution—the TA—males are more effective endorsers. 
 




Figure 8 shows predicted probability of supporting the law among citizens with patrilineal and 
matrilineal customs. 





Table 5. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (patrilineal) 
 
Strongly do not support Do not support Support Strongly support 
Comparisons of treatments with control 
   
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.493 0.498 0.487 0.481 
Female TA vs. control (3 vs. 1) 
0.787 0.975 0.785 0.968 
Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1) 0.868 0.633 0.399 0.648 
Male TA vs. control (5 vs. 1) 0.182 0.300 0.347 0.227 
Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional) 
   
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2) 0.792 0.432 0.298 0.559 
Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4) .036* .020* .003** .005** 
Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male) 
   
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2) 0.272 .087† .012* .083† 
Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3) .412 0.230 0.273 0.316 
Other comparisons 
    
Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) .426 0.563 0.769 0.497 
Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) 0.679 0.729 0.680 0.679 
Pooled comparisons (Gender)     
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.483 0.452 0.430 0.451 
Male vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.407 0.465 0.538 0.450 
Male vs. female (3 vs. 2) 0.798 0.681 0.466 0.693 
Pooled comparisons (Institution)     
TA vs. control (2 vs. 1) 0.210 0.130 0.136 0.148 
MP vs. control (3 vs. 1) 0.060† 0.076† 0.580† 0.046* 
MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2) 0.883 0.864 0.923 0.888 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.  
 
 
Examining pooled results (Table 5), we find that among patrilineal citizens, there is no 
difference in male versus female comparisons, and the MPs are less effective than the control (a 




backfire effect) (p<.05). Among this group of respondents, the impact of the authority type 
depends on the authority’s gender. 
 The size of the backfire effects in the heterogeneous effects analysis seems the same as 
across the entire sample. However, we find that for matrilineal respondents, endorsements by 
male MPs are not only the least effective, but they elicit a backfire effect, relative to the control. 
Among matrilineal citizens—who are least likely to place trust in male authorities, the male MP 
elicits lower support (73%) than the control (86%), significant at the p<.01 level. This is 
consistent with H7ii, which anticipates several possible backfire effects. We find no support for 
biased assimilation in the study. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 From these findings, we draw two conclusions (see Table 6). First, we find that TAs may 
be effective as messengers of women’s rights reforms among some population subgroups. Yet, 
their effectiveness depends on their gender, with female TAs often more effective than male 
TAs. Drawing on gender role congruity and institutional trust theories, we argue that the female 
TA’s relative effectiveness compared to the other authorities is due to high public trust in TAs, 
coupled with women’s stereotyped competence in the area of women’s rights. Moreover, the 
female TA is the only authority type that does not create a backfire effect. The female TA 
produces the higher support in the sample as a whole and among female and matrilineal citizens. 
However, the female TA is not significantly more effective than the female MP. This suggests 
support for H2 (gendered policy competence) and H3 (intersectional hypothesis). 
Second, we find that the effectiveness of the messengers depends on the population sub-
group, according to their level of trust in and gender role congruity views concerning the four 




endorsers. While the male MP is less effective than both female messengers among matrilineal 
citizens (p<.05), he was the most effective messenger among patrilineal citizens (though the 
difference is significant only in relation to the male TA, p<.01). While we found no support for 
biased assimilation (H6) when comparing the endorsements to the control, we found evidence for 
a backfire effect among matrilineal respondents (H7ii), for whom the male MP’s endorsement 
decreased support relative to the control (p<.05) 
Taken together, these results show that the impact of the messenger depends on the 
intersection of authority type and authority gender, as well as on the type of respondent. They 
also raise the specter of backfire effects—the possibility of doing harm. 
 
  




Table 6. Summary of results 
















Female TA, though 
not significantly 
more than any 
other treatment or 
the control 
- Female MP 
(p<.05), male 
MP (p<.10), 








    
Female respondents Female TA, though 
not significantly 
more than the 
control, female MP, 







Male respondents - - - - 
Matrilineal respondents Female TA, though 
not significantly 
more than the 
control, female MP, 














Patrilineal respondents Male MP, though 
not significantly 
more than the 
control, female MP, 










Both scholars and policymakers grapple with the questions of when and how TAs 
provide effective governance in support of development and human rights goals. The results of 
our survey experiment suggest that the answers depend on the authority’s gender and citizens’ 




characteristics. We find that under particular circumstances, TAs can be more effective endorsers 
of policy messages than MPs. This is the case for female TAs in the sample as a whole, as well 
as among women, those who follow matrilineal customs, and those who hold supportive attitudes 
about gender equality.  
 At the same time, our analysis suggests that the gender of the TA is important. For a 
gender-sensitive child marriage reform law, female TAs and female MPs are more effective than 
their male counterparts in the sample as a whole, as well as among women, those who follow 
matrilineal customs, and those who hold supportive attitudes about gender equality. More 
research is needed to compare the impact of these types of authorities across policies associated 
with the stereotyped competencies of male and female leaders. 
 Our findings have important implications for the growing body of research on traditional 
governance, which we extend by demonstrating the need for an intersectional theory of policy 
advocacy. If traditional leaders are increasingly being seen as partners in development we need 
more research into how different background characteristics such as age, gender, education, and 
political engagement may affect both their capacity to carry out reforms and to what extent they 
are seen as relevant drivers of change in their communities. This research could form the basis 
for developing new theories of how and when traditional leaders may serve to promote or 
impede change. This is particularly critical within the area of gender law reform where we need 
more studies to further establish how traditional and political institutions complement one 
another for more effective policy implementation. 
Our findings also have implications for international agencies, national governments, and 
civil-society organizations across the developing world that champion human rights initiatives 
and provide traditional leaders with a significant role in the implementation of such reform 




initiatives. Traditional leaders can play a constructive role in brokering infrastructure 
development projects, as well as projects aimed at enhancing gender equality. Yet, their impact 
is complex in a society such as Malawi’s, whose diverse ethnic and societal practices mirror 
most of Africa. Among some groups, male leaders can be effective, while in others, women are 
better placed to play this role.  
Some cautions are in order. The presence of traditional institutions might not always be 
positive; they may sometimes undermine the role of elected representatives and the consolidation 
of democracy. In the long run, this could become detrimental to women’s rights and 
empowerment. Several actors can be effective endorsers among different groups, but they also 
have the potential to do harm when the wrong authority pushes a policy that one or more groups 
see as running counter to their interests and not falling within the authority’s supposed 
competencies. Rights concerning gender equality, sexuality, and reproduction are policy areas 
that are sensitive to prior beliefs and backfire effects, and reform promotion applying the 
“wrong” messenger could impact the support of the reform significantly. This underscores the 
need to gather context-specific information and to develop an effective strategy for engaging 
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Appendix 1: Randomization Checks and Question Wording for Independent Variables 
A randomized block design was used. All test showed that randomization was effective. 
In order to reduce questionnaire length, a random subset of the 7,750 respondents in the LGPI 
took part in the experiment. Table A1.1 shows that the 1,381 respondents who received the child 
marriage endorsement study embedded in the LGPI were randomly distributed across the 15 
electoral districts (p<.422). 
 
Table A1.1. Randomized block design: Selection of respondents to take part in child 
marriage endorsement experiment  
Respondents not selected Respondents selected Total 
Balaka 307(85.3%) 53(14.7%) 360(100.0%) 
Blantyre 571(81.6%) 129(18.4%) 700(100.0%) 
Chikwawa 572(80.5%) 139(19.6%) 711 (100.1%) 
Chitipa 289(82.1%) 63(17.95) 352(100.0%) 
Dedza 573(80.4%) 140(19.6%) 713(100.0%) 
Kasungu 280(85.6%) 47(14.4%) 327(100.0%) 
Lilongwe 595(83.6%) 117(16.4%) 712 (100.0%) 
Mangochi 281(81.7%) 63(18.3%) 344(100.0%) 
Mulanje 294(82.6%) 62(17.4%) 356(100.0%) 
Mzimba 1,144(81.4%) 262(18.6%) 1,406(100.0%) 
Nkhatabay 293(84.0%) 56(16.1%) 349(100.1%) 
Nsanje 281(79.4%) 73(20.6%) 354(100.0%) 
Ntcheu 293(84.2%) 55(15.8%) 348(100.0%) 
Rumphi 300(84.0%) 57(16.0%) 357(100.0%) 
Zomba 295(81.9%) 65(18.1%) 360(100.0%) 
Total 6,368(82.2%) 1,381(17.8%) 7,749(100.0%) 
Two-tailed χ22 test shows treatments are randomly distributed across electoral districts (p<.422). 
 
Table A1.2 shows that the 1,381 respondents who were selected to take part in the 
experiment were randomly assigned to either the control or the four treatment groups (p<.891).  
 
 
Table A1.2. Randomized block design: Assignment of respondents to control and 
experimental conditions 
 





Control Female MP Female TA Male MP Male TA Total 
Balaka 15(28.3%) 6(11.3%) 8(15.1%) 11(20.8%) 13(24.5%) 53(100.0%) 
Blantyre 24(18.6%) 22(17.1%) 26(20.2%) 28(21.7%) 29(22.5%) 129(100.1%) 
Chikwawa 31(22.3%) 25(18.0%) 23(16.6%) 33(23.7%) 27(19.4%) 139(100.0%) 
Chitipa 15(23.8%) 13(20.6%) 16(25.4%) 12(19.1%) 7(11.1%) 63(100.0%) 
Dedza 29(20.7%) 22(15.7%) 28(20.0%) 31(22.1%) 30(21.4%) 140(99.9%) 
Kasungu 5(10.6%) 10(21.3%) 6(12.8%) 12(25.5%) 14(29.8%) 47(100.0%) 
Lilongwe 21(18.0%) 24(20.5%) 24(20.5%) 21(18.0%) 27(23.1%) 117(100.1%) 
Mangochi 10(15.9%) 13(20.6%) 12(19.1%) 18(28.6%) 10(15.9%) 63(100.1% 
Mulanje 9(14.5%) 15(24.2%) 15(24.2%) 10(16.1%) 13(21.0%) 62(100.0%) 
Mzimba 59(22.5%) 60(22.9%) 54(20.6%) 41(15.7%) 48(18.3%) 262(100.0%) 
Nkhatabay 12(21.4%) 9(16.1%) 15(26.8%) 8(14.3%) 12(21.4%) 56(100.0%) 
Nsanje 20(27.4%) 16(21.9%) 15(20.6%) 10(13.7%) 12(16.4%) 73(100.0%) 
Ntcheu 11(20.0%) 9(16.4%) 12(21.8%) 10(18.2%) 13(23.6%) 55(100.0%) 
Rumphi 13(22.8%) 10(17.5%) 10(17.5%) 9(15.8%) 15(26.3%) 57(99.9%) 
Zomba 10(15.4%) 15(23.1%) 11(16.9%) 15(23.1%) 14(21.5%) 65(100.0%) 
Total 284(20.6%) 269(19.5%) 275(19.9%) 269(19.5%) 284(20.6%) 1,381(100.1%) 
Two-tailed χ2 2test show treatments are randomly distributed across electoral districts (p<.891). 
  
 
There were no differences in response rates (i.e., attrition rates) across the five 
conditions. Only 12 respondents did not provide an answer on the dependent variable and 
missing data was not related to condition.  
Table A1.3 shows that the conditions were randomly distributed across demographic 
variables, as shown by insignificant chi-square tests. Question wording and descriptive statistics 
for all independent variables are also given. 
 
Table A1.3. Randomization of treatment and descriptive statistics for independent 
variables 
  
Control Female MP Female TA Male MP Male TA 
Gender 
     
Male 22.3% 18.2% 18.8% 19.2% 21.5% 
Female 19.7% 20.2% 20.5% 19.6% 20.0% 
(N=1,378/Mean=.65/Sd=.48) χ2(4)=2.4283(p<.658)       
Interviewer gender 
Male 19.4% 18.9% 20.8% 20.3% 20.6% 
Female 22.2% 20.3% 18.7% 18.4% 20.4% 
(N=1,377/Mean=.42/Sd=.49) χ2(4)=2.8524(p<.583)       
Gender role congruent views1 
   
Prefer male 17.1% 14.1% 20.1% 24.2% 24.5% 




Prefer male or no difference 20.8% 19.6% 20.2% 18.9% 21.0% 
Prefer female 23.0% 22.3% 19.5% 17.7% 17.6% 
(N=1,350/Mean=.43/Sd=.49) χ2(4)=10.3154(p<.021)*       
Patrilineal/Matrilineal1 
Does not pay lobola (Matrilineal) 19.5% 17.6% 18.2% 22.1% 22.7% 
Pay lobola (Patrilineal) 21.9% 21.2% 21.5% 17.0% 18.4% 
(N=1,368/Mean=.49/Sd=.50) χ2(4)=12.6223(p<.013)*       
Economic status2 
First quartile 20.8% 18.9% 19.5% 19.3% 21.5% 
Second quartile 19.3% 21.8% 17.5% 19.1% 22.1% 
Third quartile 24.5% 15.9% 20.5% 21.5% 17.6% 
Fourth quartile 18.3% 21.1% 22.2% 18.3% 20.1% 
(N=1,368/Mean=2.30/Sd=1.14) χ2(12)=11.1280(p<.518)       
Education 
No formal schooling 27.4% 17.4% 16.4% 19.9% 18.9% 
Some primary school 18.6% 19.1% 19.8% 20.7% 21.8% 
Some primary school completed 23.9% 20.0% 20.9% 17.0% 18.5% 
Some intermediate school or more 16.6% 22.5% 22.5% 18.7% 19.8% 
(N=1,366/Mean=2.32/Sd=.89) χ2(12)=14.8515(p<.250)       
Rural residence4 
Urban or small town 17.5% 19.8% 21.4% 19.8% 21.4% 
Rural 21.3% 19.4% 19.5% 19.4% 20.4% 
(N=1,376/Mean=.81/Sd=.39) χ2(4)=2.0386(p<.729)       
Age groups 
<25 years 18.2% 17.0% 20.4% 22.5% 21.9% 
25-34 years 19.3% 21.1% 18.2% 19.5% 21.9% 
35-44 years 23.0% 19.3% 18.9% 20.3% 18.6% 
>45 years 22.2% 20.1% 21.6% 16.4% 19.8% 
(N=1,378/Mean=2.53/Sd=1.13) χ2(12)=10.2369(p<.595) 
Two-tailed χ2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across groups for all independent and control 
variables, with the exception of a priori gender attitudes (p<.05) and lineal customs (p<.05). 1 The higher 
the value, the more assets a household possesses. How likely would you be to vote for a female candidate 
in a parliamentary election? Would you be more likely to vote for her than a male (=1/Supports), less 
likely to vote for her (=0/Opposes), or would you say that there is no difference (=0/Opposes)? 2 In your 
family, is lobola [bride price/dowry] paid when people get married? Yes (=0/Patrilineal). No 
(=1/Matrilineal). 3 The asset index was created by performing a multiple correspondence analysis on four 




We also conducted additional randomization checks for comparisons between each single 
(i.e.., female MP, female TA, male MP, and male TA) and pooled condition (i.e., pooled female, 
pooled male, pooled TA, and pooled MP) and the control and each single and pooled condition 
with one another to determine whether the conditions are randomly distributed across each pair 
of conditions. In each comparison, randomization was effective, as shown by insignificant chi 
square tests of significance, with the following exceptions: (1) there are more patrilineal citizens 




who received the control than the male MP condition (p<.027), (2) there are more patrilineal 
citizens who received the control than the pool male (male MP and male TA) condition (p<.016), 
(3) there are more patrilineal citizens who received the female MP than the male TA condition 
(p<.009), and there are more patrilineal citizens who received the male MP than the male TA 




Appendix 2: Regression Models with Controls 
 
 
 Appendix 2 gives the full ordered logistic regression results for the models reported in the 
paper, which include control variables: respondent and interviewer gender (Benstead, 2014), 
whether the respondent follows matrilineal or patrilineal customs, rural residence, age, income 
quartile, and education level, as well as post-stratification weights. Tables A2.1 and A2.2 give 
the ordered logistic regression results for the average treatment effects reported in Figure 5 and 
Table 2, first for all four experimental conditions (Table A2.1) and second for the models pooled 
by messenger gender and institution (Table A2.2). 
 
Table A2.1. Ordered logistic model for support for child marriage reform: Average treatment 
effects (Figure 5 and Table 2) 
Variable Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients: 





Female MP (2) .04(1.07) 
Female TA (3) .60(1.43) 
Male MP (4) -.17(.98) 
Male TA (5) -1.27(1.00) 















(Female Interviewer Gender) 
 
1-1 -.18(.52) 


















2-2 -.42( .55) 






















1 - Some Primary School 1.05(.52)† 
1 - Primary School Complete .67(.48) 
1- Intermediate to Post-Secondary 1.33(.47)* 
2 - Some Primary School -.12(.78) 
2 - Primary School Complete -.03(.79) 
2 - Intermediate to Post-Secondary -.04(.82) 
3 - Some Primary School -.95(.78) 
3 - Primary School Complete -1.13(.76) 
3 - Intermediate to Post-Secondary -1.95(.69)* 
4 - Some Primary School .27(.51) 
4 - Primary School Complete .66(.70) 
4- Intermediate to Post-Secondary .73(.82) 
5 - Some Primary School .39(.46) 
5 - Primary School Complete -.16(.74) 













































Population Size 5,190,307 
Design DF 19 
Number of Strata 3 




Number of PSUs 22 
Number of Poststrata 147 
Adjusted Wald Test (F) 
 
Female MP-Female TA (2-3) F(1,19)=.09 
Female MP-Male MP (2-4) F(1,19)=.03 
Female MP-Male TA (2-5) F(1,19)=.83 
Female TA-Male MP (3-4) F(1,19)=0.32 
Female TA-Male TA (3-5) F(1,19)=2.17 
Male MP-Male TA (4-5) F(1,19)=.92 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table A2.2. Ordered logistic model for support for child marriage reform: Average treatment 
effects, Pooled models (Figure 5 and Table 2) 
 




Effects (Figure 5 and 
Table 2) 









Female MP (2) .29(.89) Female MP (2) -.89(.96) 











1-1 .38( .26) 1-1 .38(.26) 
2-1 .44(.27) 2-1 .08(.22) 











1-1 -.18(.51) 1-1 -.18(.51) 
2-1 .21(.25) 2-1 .48(.29) 
3-1 1.60(.33)*** 3-1 1.71(.29)*** 










1-1 -.88(.36)* 1-1 -.88(.36)* 
2-1 -1.01(.24)*** 2-1 -.87(.32)* 
3-1 -.33(.24) 3-1 -.23(.35) 
Experimental 
Condition (Gender Role 
Congruent Views/Would 
Vote for Female) 
 
Experimental 
Condition (Gender Role 
Congruent Views/Would 
Vote for Female) 
 
1-2 -1.54(.58)* 1-2 -1.54(.58)* 
1-3 -1.05(.62) 1-3 -1.05(.62) 
2-2 -.31(.30) 2-2 .04(.34) 
2-3 .52(.27)† 2-3 .80(.36)* 
3-2 .26(.23) 3-2 -.29(.33) 







1-1 .24(.53) 1-1 .24(.53) 
2-1 .08(.33) 2-1 .45(.36) 







1 - Some Primary School 1.04(.51)† 1 - Some Primary School 1.04(.52)† 
1 - Primary School 
Complete 
.66(.48) 1 - Primary School 
Complete 
.66(.48) 
1- Intermediate to Post-
Secondary 
1.32(.46)** 1- Intermediate to Post-
Secondary 
1.32(.46)** 
2 - Some Primary School -.48(.52) 2 - Some Primary School .11(.45) 
2 - Primary School 
Complete 
-.46(.49) 2 - Primary School 
Complete 
-.32(.56) 
2 - Intermediate to Post-
Secondary 
-.93(.54) 2 - Intermediate to Post-
Secondary 
-.39(.42) 
3 - Some Primary School .54(.41) 3 - Some Primary School .28(.46) 
3 - Primary School 
Complete 
.39(.61) 3 - Primary School 
Complete 
.49(.53) 
3 - Intermediate to Post-
Secondary 
.85(.52) 3 - Intermediate to Post-
Secondary 
.71(.55) 












1-2 -.55(.47) 1-2 -.55(.47) 
1-3 .05(.45) 1-3 .05(.45) 
1-4 -.14(.73) 1-4 -.14(.73) 
2-2 -.25(.41) 2-2 .03(.35) 
2-3 -.73(.42) 2-3 -.47(.42) 
2-4 -.48(.40) 2-4 -.36(.25) 
3-2 -.48(.33) 3-2 -.42(.43) 
3-3 -.34(.30) 3-3 -.31(.31) 
3-4 -.90(.30)** 3-4 -.78(.46) 
Experimental 
Condition (Age Groups) 
 
Experimental 
Condition (Age Groups) 
 
1-2 .32(.61) 1-2 .32(.61) 
1-3 .63(.52) 1-3 .63(.51) 
1-4 1.41(.71)† 1-4 1.41(.71)† 
2-2 .90(.34)* 2-2 .76(.45) 
2-3 .19(.32) 2-3 .71(.38)† 
2-4 .30(.30) 2-4 .18(.33) 
3-2 .42(.46) 3-2 .37(.20)† 
3-3 .10(.58) 3-3 -.04(.29) 
3-4 .26(.51) 3-4 .39(.30) 
/cut1 -2.63(.73)** /cut1 -2.64(.74)** 
/cut2 -2.18(.74)** /cut2 -2.18(.74)** 
/cut3 -1.42(.75)† /cut3 -1.43(.74)† 
N 1,334 N 1,334 
Population Size 5,190,307 Population Size 5,190,307 
Design DF 19 Design DF 19 
Number of Strata 3 Number of Strata 3 
Number of PSUs 22 Number of PSUs 22 
Number of Poststrata 147 Number of Poststrata 147 
Adjusted Wald Test (F) 
 
Adjusted Wald Test (F) 
 




Female MP-Female TA (2-
3) 















Table A2.3. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (male) 
 
Strongly do not support Do not support Support Strongly support 
Comparisons of treatments with control 
   
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1) .475 .368 .284 .381 
Female TA vs. control (3 vs. 1) .197 .193 .221 .174 
Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1) .202 .400 .844 .352 




Male TA vs. control (5 vs. 1) .908 .800 .728 .828 
Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional) 
   
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2) .429 .571 .783 .514 
Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4) .345 .362 .574 .375 
Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male) 
   
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2) .707 .937 .391 .971 
Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3) .287 .239 .233 .249 
Other comparisons 
    
Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) .414 .219 .166 .273 
Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) .592 .466 .293 .467 
Pooled comparisons (Gender) 
    
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1) .287 .191 .148 .206 
Male vs. control (3 vs. 1) .517 .484 .463 .483 
Male vs. female (3 vs. 2) .675 .633 .563 .634 
Pooled comparisons (Institution) 
    
TA vs. control (2 vs. 1) .210 .130 .136 .148 
MP vs. control (3 vs. 1) .060† .076† .058† .046* 
MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2) .883 .864 .923 .888 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10. 
 
 
 
 
